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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1994 Session of the General Assembly enacted legislation
dealing with wills, trusts, and estates that added, amended, or
repealed a number of sections of the Code of Virginia (the
Code). In addition to this legislation, there were six Supreme
Court of Virginia opinions, one federal district court opinion,
one Virginia Circuit Court opinion, and one Virginia Attorney
General's opinion in the year ending June 1, 1994 that involved
issues of interest to both the general practitioner and the spe-
cialist in wills, trusts, and estates. This article analyzes each of
these legislative and judicial developments.'
II. 1994 LEGISLATION
A. Children of Assisted Conception
The 1991 Session added a new chapter to the Code to deal
with the status of children of assisted conception, effective July
1, 1993.2 This comprehensive legislation expressly provided
that its rules control in determining the status of a child for a
number of stipulated succession purposes.3 Unfortunately this
legislation conflicted with existing section 64.1-7.1 dealing with
the status of a child born through reproductive technology, its
interface with other sections of Title 64.1 (Wills and Decedents'
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond, T. C. Williams School of Law; B.A.,
1965, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1967, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, Col-
lege of William and Mary; LL.M., 1970, New York University.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Code of Virginia sections,
they will generally be referred to in the text by their section numbers only.
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
3. Id. § 20-164 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
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Estates) was uncertain and it created some administrative prob-
lems. These problems and the 1994 legislative responses thereto
are set forth below.
1. Limited Ten-Month Period
Section 20-158.B(ii) provides that if a person consents to
being a parent in a writing executed prior to an implantation,
then a child resulting therefrom is the consenting parent's child
even though born after the consenting parent's death without
any limitation on the period of time that might be involved.4 As
originally enacted, this rule posed obvious problems in the or-
derly settlement of decedents' estates and the distribution of
trusts, not to mention what would have been a violation of the
rule against perpetuities if it appeared in a private document.
Accordingly, section 20-164 was amended to provide that "a
child born more than ten months after the death of a parent
shall not be recognized as such parent's child for the purposes
of subdivisions (i), (ii) and (iii) of this section."5
2. Class Gifts
The original class gift provision of section 20-164(iii) made
the new rules applicable only when an individual was taking
"as a member of a class determined by reference to the rela-
tionship."' Thus no express coverage was provided for cases
4. Id. § 20-158(BXii) (Cum. Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
5. Act of Apr. 20, 1994, ch. 919, 1994 Va. Acts 1529 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-164 (Cum. Supp. 1994)). The subdivisions referred to read as follows: "i) intes-
tate succession; (ii) probate law exemptions, allowances, or other protections for chil-
dren in a parent's estate; and (iii) determining eligibility of the child or its descen-
dants to share in a donative transfer from any person as an individual or as a mem-
ber of a class determined by reference to the relationship." Id. (emphasized language
added in 1994).
The interface between this provision and Title 64.1 is further strengthened by
an amendment to section 64.1-8.1, dealing with afterborn heirs. As amended, this
section now reads as follows: "Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death
but born thereafter, and children resulting from assisted conception born after
decedent's death who are determined to be relatives of the decedent as provided in
Chapter 9 (§ 20-156 et seq.) of Title 20, shall inherit as if they had been born during
the lifetime of the decedent." Act of Apr. 20, 1994, ch. 919, 1994 Va. Acts 1529 (codi-
fied at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-8.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
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where a testator might devise "to my sister's first-born child,"
or use other relational language to make a gift to an individual.
Accordingly, section 20-164(iii) was amended by the addition of
alternative language "as an individual or" in order that the new
rule might clearly be applicable to individual gifts. 7
3. Exclusiveness
Although section 20-164 was intended to be the exclusive law
when dealing with the rights of children of assisted conception
in all succession matters, this was not expressly so stated.
Instead, section 20-164 referred only to its dominance under
Title 20 (Domestic Relations) and to three previously enumerat-
ed succession categories.' To prevent any possible problem in
the future, the General Assembly passed legislation (1) repeal-
ing former section 64.1-7.1, s dealing with the status of a child
born through the performance of reproductive technology and
(2) further amending section 20-164 by adding thereto a refer-
ence to Title 64.1 (Wills and Decedents' Estates) as being com-
pletely superseded by the status provisions in Title 20 (Domes-
tic Relations).0
4. Integration of Titles 20 and 64.1
Section 64.1-5.1, dealing with the meaning of child and other
related terms for succession purposes,1 was amended to rein-
force the exclusiveness of the new rules in Title 20 and to point
the practitioner in that direction. The amendment to the status
7. The complete subdivision, with the 1994 amending language emphasized,
reads as follows: "(iii) determining eligibility of the child of its descendants to share
in a donative transfer from any person as an individual or as a member of a class
determined by reference to the relationship." Act of Apr. 20, 1994, ch. 919, 1994 Va.
Acts 1529 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164(i)-(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
9. Act of Apr. 20, 1994, ch. 919, 1994 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164
(Cum. Supp. 1994) (repealing VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991)).
10. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
11. Although this section is found in the intestate succession chapter of Title
64.1, its opening sentence clearly shows its applicability to all other chapters of Title
64.1. The opening sentence reads as follows: "If, for purposes of this title a relation-
ship of parent and child must be established to determine succession by, through or
from a person . . . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1 (Cure. Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
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section of Title 64.1 provides that "[t]he parentage of a child
resulting from assisted conception shall be determined as pro-
vided in Chapter 9 (§ 20-156 et seq.) of Title 20."12
B. Simultaneous Death
The 1994 Session adopted the Revised Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act. 3 The nature of this Survey and space limitations
preclude a line-by-line analysis of this comprehensive legisla-
tion.14 However, one dramatic change must be noted. The
scope of the law is now much broader than true simultaneous
death. The new Act presumes that, even though a primary
beneficiary actually survives the donor, the donor would want
the gift to fail and pass instead to donor's secondary beneficiary
if the primary beneficiary's period of survivorship is insubstan-
tial. The required survivorship time is the five-day period (ex-
pressed as 120 hours) adopted by the Uniform Probate Code in
1969.'5
C. Pour-Over Wills
One very popular estate planning concept is the consolidation
of a decedent's assets by way of a testamentary gift of the
decedent's residuary estate to the decedent's previously estab-
lished inter vivos trust. 6 This "pour-over will" concept is codi-
12. Act of Apr. 20, 1994, ch. 919, 1994 Va. Acts 1529 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-5.1.2 (Cure. Supp. 1994)).
13. Act of Apr. 8, 1994, ch. 475, 1994 Va. Acts 660 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 64.1-104.1 to -104.9 (Cum. Supp. 1994)) (enacting UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH
ACT, 8 U.L.A. 11 (Supp. 1994)).
14. For a discussion of this Act, in the context of Virginia law, see J. Rodney
Johnson, The New Simultaneous Death Act: Welcome Changes for Donative Transfers,
VA. B. AsS'N J. Fall 1993 at 5. A national discussion of the issue can be found in J.
Rodney Johnson, The New Simultaneous Death Act, PROB. & PROP. May/June 1994 at
22. Copies of the Act, containing the Commissioner's official comments which will be
helpful in understanding this new law, may be obtained from the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 676 North St. Clair Street, Suite 1700,
Chicago, Illinois 60611. The substantive Virginia departures from the official text are
discussed in the Virginia Bar Association article.
15. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-104, 2-601, 8 U.L.A. 64, 128 (1983) (intestate succes-
sion and wills, respectively). The new legislation codifies the 120-hour rule for statu-
tory rights, for governing instruments, and for co-owners with the right of survivor-
ship. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-104.2 to .4 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
16. The consolidation results in the decedent's assets being held and administered
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fled in section 64.1-73 which, however, has generally contem-
plated the existence of a valid trust to serve as a receptacle for
the property being poured over under a will.17 One problem
encountered by lawyers in suggesting the use of a pour-over is
the inability or unwillingness of some clients to place assets
into the inter vivos trust (referred to as "funding") during the
client's lifetime and, under the American common law rule, "(a)
trust cannot be created unless there is trust property."
8
For some time section 64.1-73 has provided an exception to
the existence-of-property rule in the case of a pour-over to an
unfunded insurance trust, which was deemed to be "established
upon execution of the instrument creating such trust regardless
of the existence, size or character of the corpus of the trust."9
In the case of a pour-over to any other type of trust, however,
section 64.1-73 has not provided for any waiver of the exis-
tence-of-property rule. Responding to this problem in the con-
text of clients' unwillingness or inability to fund these other
trusts, another common practice developed of asking clients to
furnish a ten or twenty-dollar bill that would be stapled to the
trust agreement of the otherwise asset-less trust in an attempt
to meet the existence-of-property rule.' The existence-of-prop-
erty rule that led to the creation of this practice was eliminated
in an inter vivos trust instead of a testamentary trust. Until recently, this method
was the only way to avoid the annual accounting that would otherwise be required of
a testamentary trustee. The 1993 Session of the General Assembly eliminated this
distinction by permitting a testator to waive the accounting requirement otherwise
imposed upon a testamentary trust. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.7 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 74 (1959). The issue was recently before
the Virginia Supreme Court in a different context. See 247 Va. 513, 443 S.E.2d 146
(1994). See also discussion infra part UI.E.
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73(BX1) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
20. The effectiveness of this tactic is unclear, in the absence of affirmative
apellate authority, because of the obvious argument that no genuine trust ever exist-
ed. In commenting upon a pour-over to a trust with a significant corpus, one appel-
late court commented as follows:
The trust from 1934 until the death of the testatrix at no time
was a mere shell without the body of a trust. The trust with substantial
assets has had since 1934 and continues to have an active independent
life of its own. We are not concerned here, for example, with a trust
with nominal or no assets in the settlor's lifetime which in substance is
created by will.
Canal National Bank v. Chapman, 157 Me. 309, 310, 171 A.2d 919, 920 (1961).
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by the 1994 amendments which extend the waiver-of-corpus
rule, heretofore limited to inter vivos insurance trusts, to all
inter vivos trusts serving as receptacles for testamentary pour-
over provisions." All inter vivos trusts serving as pour-over
receptacles are now deemed to be established "upon execution
of the instrument creating such trust," for the purposes of the
pour-overY In other words, the existence-of-property rule has
been transformed into an existence-of-instrument rule, insofar
as inter vivos receptacle trusts are concerned. However, it is
important to note that the amendment to section 64.1-73 deals
only with pour-overs to receptacle inter vivos trusts. The new
rule does not have any applicability to a standard or non-recep-
tacle inter vivos trust which must still comply with the common
law existence-of-property rule.' Lastly, this section's former ef-
fective date provision is amended to provide for the applicability
of the new rule to pour-over provisions in the wills of persons
dying after June 30, 1994.2'
D. Probate Avoidance-TOD Security Registration
The P.O.D. or "payable on death" concept that is recognized
by the federal government with regard to savings bonds,' and
by Virginia with regard to accounts in financial institutions,"
is expanded by the 1994 Session's enactment of the Uniform
Transfer on Death (TOD) Security Registration Act.' The na-
ture of this Survey and space limitations preclude a line-by-line
analysis of this new legislation." However, the following five
21. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 562, 1994 Va. Acts 787 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-73(B) (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73(BX1) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
23. See id.
24. Id. § 64.1-73(H) (Cum. Supp. 1994). It is easy to understand the insertion of
a prospective effective date. However, it is not apparent why the following saving
language from the prior repealed effective date provision was not retained: "However,
the provisions of this section shall not be construed as casting any doubt upon the
validity [of] . . . any devise or bequest which does not come within the provisions of
this section." This language was eliminated from Virginia Code section 64.1-73(G) by
Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 562, 1994 Va. Acts 787.
25. 31 C.F.R. § 315.7 (1993).
26. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-125.1 to .16 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
27. Act of Apr. 7, 1994, ch. 472, 1994 Va. Acts 655 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 64.1-206.1 to .8 (Cum. Supp. 1994)) (enacting UNiF. TRANSFER ON DEATH (TOD)
SECURITIES REGISTRATION ACT, 8B U.L.A. 479 (1983)).
28. As no substantive changes were made by Virginia in adopting this Uniform
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points might be briefly noted. First, no entity is required to
offer securities in TOD form; instead the Act encourages enti-
ties to offer such registration by providing significant protective
provisions for those who do.' Second, although major national
corporations may not accept this invitation for a period of time,
one can immediately have the benefit of the Act by simply re-
titling one's security account with one's broker as a TOD ac-
count.30 And, if greater flexibility is desired, one can obviously
have more than a single security account. Third, a variety of
beneficiary designations are contemplated."' Fourth, although
no mention is made thereof in the Act's official comments, it is
clear that, as the Act refers to a TOD beneficiary as a "per-
son32 instead of an "individual," one can name a charity as a
TOD beneficiary, or use the TOD designation to pour over secu-
rities to an inter vivos trust at death." Lastly, this Act will be
of particular assistance to individuals who, in the past, have at-
tempted to keep their securities out of probate by registering
them jointly in their name and the name of their intended
successor. A joint registration immediately passes a one-half
interest to the other person, to the sorrow of the original owner
when the other asserts lifetime ownership rights, when the
other's creditors levy thereon, or when the original owner de-
sires a change of successor. All of these problems are eliminat-
Act, the Commissioners official comments thereto will be particularly helpful in gain-
ing a complete understanding of its operation and potential utilization. Copies of the
Act, containing these comments, may be obtained from the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 676 North St. Clair Street, Suite 1700, Chica-
go, Illinois 60611.
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-206.6 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
30. Id. § 64.1-206.1 (defining "security" as including "security account" which, in
turn, is defined as including a "securities account with a broker").
31. One example offered by the Act is "John S. Brown Mary B. Brown JT TEN
TOD John S. Brown, Jr., LDPS." Id. § 64.1-206(8XBX3). In such a case, John and
Mary own with survivorship between them, and on the death of the second to die,
John Jr. will become the owner or, if John Jr. is not then surviving, the ownership
will pass to John Jr.'s then surviving lineal descendants in accordance with the law
of intestate succession.
32. Id. § 64.1-206.1 (definition of "beneficiary"). For the treatment of the word
"person" in Virginia, see Code § 1-13.19 (Repl. Vol. 1987), and cases annotated there-
under. Note also that the Act uses the more restrictive term, "individual," when
identifying those who may create a TOD account. Id. § 64.1-206(2XA).
33. Note, however, that such a pour-over could only be made to a fimded trust.
The 1994 amendments to § 64.1-73, eliminating the corpus requirement for a recepta-
cle trust, are applicable only when devises or bequests are made thereto. See discus-
sion supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
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ed under the Act because a TOD registration "has no effect on
ownership until the owner's death ... [and it] may be canceled
or changed at any time... without the consent of the benefi-
ciary.
E. Virginia Inheritance Tax
Prior to the repeal of the Virginia inheritance tax, the Code
provided for inheritance tax upon a remainder interest devised
or bequeathed by a decedent to be assessed "at the time when
the beneficiary becomes entitled to the same in possession or
enjoyment."35 The Virginia Estate Tax Act,3" which replaced
the repealed inheritance tax, imposed an estate tax3 7 that
would result in a form of double taxation of remainder interests
in some cases if literally applied, because the repealed Virginia
inheritance tax laws are still applicable with respect to untaxed
interests derived from estates of decedents who died prior to
January 1, 1980.'
For example, suppose a decedent's will created a trust prior
to January 1, 1980, for the surviving spouse for life in the
typical way that would qualify for the federal estate tax marital
deduction,39 and then provided for the remainder to pass to
the children. As previously noted, the Virginia inheritance tax
on the children's remainder would not be assessed until the life
tenant's death. However, under federal estate tax law, which is
34. Act of Apr. 7, 1994, ch. 422, 1994 Va. Acts 593 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-206.4 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-173 (Repl. Vol. 1974), repealed by Act of Apr. 10, 1978,
ch. 838, 1978 Va. Acts 1465 (second enactment).
36. Act of Apr. 10, 1978, ch. 838, 1978 Va. Acts 1465 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 58.1-900 to -938 (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1994)).
37. This estate tax is imposed in the amount of the "federal credit," which is
defined as "the maximum amount of credit for state death taxes allowable by § 2011
of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended or renumbered, or
successor provision, in respect to a decedent's taxable estate." VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
901 (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
38. Id. § 58-173 (Repl. Vol. 1974), replaced by VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-900 to -938
(Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
39. The most popular way to make a gift qualifying for the federal estate tax
marital deduction at this time was by way of a trust pursuant to section 2056(bX5)
of the Internal Revenue Code, which required that the surviving spouse be entitled to
all of the income for life and have either an inter vivos or testamentary general
power of appointment over the corpus. I.R.C. § 2056(bX5) (1986).
1152
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
incorporated into the operation of the Virginia Estate Tax Act,
the entire value of the property in question (life estate and
remainder) will be included in the estate of the surviving
spouse upon the surviving spouse's death. 0 Thus, upon the
death of the surviving spouse, the remainder interest will be
taxable twice, once to the children under the preserved portion
of the Virginia inheritance tax law, and again in the surviving
spouse's estate under the Virginia Estate Tax Act. In order to
prevent this unfairness, the Virginia Department of Taxation
did not apply the law literally but developed an unwritten poli-
cy of not taxing a remainder if the remainder was included in
the taxable estate of the life tenant. Recently, some question
has developed about the continued existence of this policy in
the Department of Taxation. The 1994 amendments eliminate
this concern by providing that "no inheritance taxes shall be
imposed on any remainder interest included in the taxable
estate and subject to the tax imposed by [the Virginia Estate
Tax Act, which incorporates federal estate tax law]."4' The
1994 amendment also confirms the existence of the prior policy
by providing that "the provisions of this act are declaratory of
existing law."42
F. Estate Taxes
1. Apportionment to Non-Probate Property
The general rule of Virginia estate tax apportionment law
calls for the estate tax burden of a decedent's estate to be ap-
portioned among the estate's beneficiaries in proportion to their
interests therein.' Notwithstanding the general rule, freedom
of choice is preserved by a further rule that allows a testator to
"designate the fund or funds or property out of which such
payment shall be made."" However, dictum in a recent federal
case casts some doubt upon the ability of a testator, whose will
contained language dealing with the apportionment of taxes, to
40. Id. § 2041 (1986).
41. Act of Apr. 12, 1994, ch. 208, 1994 Va. Acts 298 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
58.1-900 (1994)) (amending Act of Apr. 10, 1978, ch. 838, 1978 Va. Acts 1465).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-900 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
43. Id. § 64.1-161 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
44. Id. § 64.1-165.
11531994]
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also direct that recipients of non-probate assets includible in
the taxable estate pay any of the estate taxes attributable
thereto.41 In response, section 64.1-165 was amended by elimi-
nating the language upon which the dictum was based.4 In
addition, section 64.1-165 was amended to expressly permit a
donor, by testamentary or inter vivos document, to provide for
non-probate property included in one's estate to bear a portion
of the estate tax burden.
2. QTIP Remainder Beneficiaries
One of the ways in which a married person may leave prop-
erty to the surviving spouse that will qualify for the federal
estate tax marital deduction is by a "QTIP" (qualified termi-
nable interest property) provision which, reduced to its simplest
aspect, is a life estate in favor of the surviving spouse.' Upon
the death of the surviving spouse in such a case, federal law
requires that the full value of the property be included in the
surviving spouse's gross estate, 9 and Virginia law apportions
the estate tax attributable thereto to the beneficiaries who take
45. Estate of Reno v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 733, 735-36 (4th Cir. 1991) (en
banc), discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts
and Estates, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 873, 899 (1992). The dictum focuses on Virginia
Code § 64.165, the portion of the anti-apportionment statute which provides that if a
will contains a direction regarding apportionment of taxes, "the provisions of the
will . . . shall be given effect to the same extent as if this article had not been en-
acted." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-165 (Cum. Supp. 1991), repealed by Act of Apr. 20,
1994, ch. 917, 1994 Va. Acts 1518, (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-165 (Cum.
Supp. 1994)). The dictum interpreted this language to mean that no estate taxes can
be collected from nonprobate assets if there is any disturbance of the statutory
scheme. Estate of Reno, 945 F.2d at 736.
46. Act of Apr. 20, 1994, ch. 917, 1994 Va. Acts 1518 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-165 (Cum. Supp. 1994)) (amended Repl. Vol. 1991). The words, "and in every
such case the provisions of the will or of such written instrument executed inter
vivos shall be given effect to the same extent as if this article had not been enacted"
are those which have been eliminated.
47. However, this portion cannot exceed a specific property's proportionate share
of the taxes unless such provision is contained in the document creating the property
interest. Id.
48. I.R.C. § 2056(bX7) (1986). To qualify, this interest must provide for the
property's income to be payable to the surviving spouse no less frequently than annu-
ally (or for the spouse to have the use of non-income producing property) for life, and
must not allow any person to have a power of appointment exercisable over the prop-
erty in favor of anyone other than the surviving spouse. Id. § 2056(b)(7Xii).
49. Id. § 2044 (1986).
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the remainder following the death of the surviving spouse. 0 As
the negotiations with the Internal Revenue Service concerning
the estate tax liability of the surviving spouse's estate will be
conducted by the estate's personal representative, this means
that those paying the tax (the remainder beneficiaries) are not
only excluded from the negotiation process, they are not even
entitled to any information concerning these proceedings.5 The
1994 amendment responds to this problem by imposing a duty
of good faith upon the surviving spouse's personal representa-
tive vis-a-vis the remainder beneficiaries of QTIP property, enti-
tling QTIP beneficiaries to certain relevant information from
the surviving spouse's personal representative, and mandating
that the representative of the QTIP beneficiaries be invited to
attend any administrative conference or proceeding with the
Internal Revenue Service where valuation issues affecting their
tax liability will be considered.52 Although the 1994 amend-
ment responds to the described problem, the real problem is far
larger than the one described. The same fairness issues are in-
volved whenever any non-probate property is included in a
decedent's estate, i.e., whenever the recipients of the property
who bear the estate tax burden are shut out of the tax resolu-
tion process. It is regrettable that the 1994 amendment focused
on only one, admittedly major, aspect of the larger issue in-
stead of providing an inclusive remedy for all takers of non-
probate property as well.
3. Directions to Pay All Taxes
A "standard" clause found in most will-drafting books and, in
this writer's experience, in most wills, is a direction to the
executor to pay all death taxes without apportionment. This
language, which causes the burden of all death taxes to be
payable out of the assets going to the residuary beneficiaries,
"is usually not appropriate . . . [and] can cause complete distor-
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-161(B) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
51. This causes some concern because of the possibility that an estate's personal
representative might make concessions concerning valuation of the QTIP property to
the detriment of the remainder beneficiaries in order to secure a concession from the
I.R.S. regarding property that is taxable to the surviving spouse's estate.
52. Act of Apr. 20, 1994, ch. 917, 1994 Va. Acts 1518 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-161(C) (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
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tion of the testator's estate plan."' One aspect of the distor-
tion problem relates to the imposition of estate taxes on non-
probate assets, which may not be thought of during the will
writing process. Another aspect relates to the number and vari-
ety of death taxes, in addition to the estate tax, which also may
not be thought of during the will writing process. Due to this
latter problem, section 64.1-66.1 has provided that a general
direction in a will "to pay all taxes imposed on account of a
testator's death or similar language," would not be construed to
include several death taxes imposed by federal law." In recog-
nition that this problem has worsened with the increase of
additional death taxes in recent years, the 1994 amendments
moved former section 64.1-66.1 into the tax apportionment act
and extended its scope to refer to six death taxes.'
4. General
In addition to the foregoing, the 1994 Session made certain
amendments of a housekeeping and clarifying nature. Perhaps
the only item of significance in this area is the recognition, in
regard to tax apportionment, of the need to take into account
not only the estate taxes levied by Virginia and the federal
government, but also those imposed by other states.'
G. Filing List of Heirs
One of the duties imposed upon the personal representative
of a decedent's estate is the filing of a list of heirs identifying
those persons who take the property of an intestate decedent or
who would have taken the same but for the will of a testate
53. Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Are You Using the 'Wrong" Tax Apportionment
Clause?, PROB. & PRop., NovlDec. 1989, at 26.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-66.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991), repealed by Act of Apr. 20, 1994,
ch. 917, 1994 Va. Acts 1518 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-165.1 (Cum. Supp.
1994)).
55. Id. § 64.1-165.1 (Cur. Supp. 1994) (dealing with taxes on: (1) qualified use
property under I.R.C. § 2032A, (2) general power of appointment property under
I.R.C. § 2041, (3) qualified terminable interest property under I.R.C. § 2044, (4) quali-
fied domestic trust property under I.R.C. § 2056A, (5) certain generation skipping
transfers under I.R.C. Chapter 13, and (6) excess retirement accumulations under
I.R.C. § 4980A).
56. Id. §§ 64.1-160, -161, -163.
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decedent." However, there has been no such requirement, in
those cases where a will is probated but no one qualifies as
personal representative. The 1994 legislation now imposes this
filing duty upon the proponent of a will under these circum-
stances."
Unfortunately, although this legislation has solved a problem
not covered by the Code, it appears to have inadvertently creat-
ed a new problem where none previously existed. In a number
of situations, particularly cases of husband and wife when the
first dies, the predominance of survivorship property and other
will substitutes eliminates the need for a decedent's will to be
probated. Prior law provided that "[i]f there has been no qualifi-
cation of a personal representative within thirty days following
death, a list of heirs may be filed by any heir or devisee.""
The 1994 legislation eliminates the words "or devisee" from this
provision, and replaces them with "at law of a decedent who
died intestate."' Thus, in those cases where the will of a tes-
tate decedent is not probated, the prior permissive authoriza-
tion for any of the decedent's heirs to file a list of heirs after
thirty days no longer exists.6' Although this gap may displease
the genealogical community, it is doubtful that it will create
any genuine legal problems.
57. Id. § 64.1-134 (Repl. Vol. 1991). In addition to the heirs' names, this section
requires that their ages, addresses, and degrees of relationship to the decedent be
stated. Id.
58. Act of Apr. 5, 1994, ch. 327, 1994 Va. Acts 457 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
64.1-134 (Cur. Supp. 1994)). This enactment further provides that all lists of heirs
must be made under oath, which appears to be duplicative because existing language
requires that the list of heirs be "accompanied by an affidavit that he [the person
filing the list of heirs] has made diligent inquiry as to such names, ages and address-
es and that he believes such list to be true and correct." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-
134(2) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-134 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
60. Id. § 64.1-134 (Cur. Supp. 1994).
61. Similarly, no devisee under an unprobated will could file a list of heirs. How-
ever, the devisee aspect of this issue raises a "chicken v. egg" predicament because
some would argue that no devisee can exist until a writing purporting to be a will is
actually probated.
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H. Tax and Court Costs in Small Estates
Section 26-4 grants the court and its clerk the discretionary
power to dispense with surety upon the official bond of personal
representatives, guardians and committees where the amount
coming into the fiduciary's possession does not exceed $5,000.62
This section has also contained a sentence providing that "on
estates of decedents of $500 or less in value there shall be no
tax or court costs upon such qualification."' The 1994 amend-
ment repeals the quoted language.' This repeal does not make
any change in Virginia law, however, because other Code sec-
tions already eliminate any tax or clerk's fee when a decedent's
estate is no more than $5,000.'
I. Personal Representatives-Waiver of Surety
To require surety upon the bond of a personal representative
who is also the sole taker of a decedent's estate would be use-
less and foolish. Extending this realization somewhat, section
64.1-121 has provided for a waiver of surety whenever there is
a complete identity between the personal representatives and
the takers of a decedent's estate, whether originally or as a
result of disclaimer, as long as there are no more than three
persons serving in this dual capacity.' The 1994 amendment
further expands this waiver of surety provision by eliminating
any restriction on the number of persons serving in this dual
capacity, and permitting the waiver as long as all of the takers
of a decedent's estate are personal representatives, even though
there may be one or more personal representatives who are not
takers."7 It is doubtful that there will be many instances
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-4 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
63. Id.
64. Act of Mar. 4, 1994, ch. 25, 1994 Va. Acts 29 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
26-4 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
65. See VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-112(4) (Repl. Vol. 1993) (providing that "[njo
[clerk's] fee shall be charged for estates of $5,000 or less for qualifying a personal
representative or other fiduciary"); Id. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1712 (Repl. Vol. 1991)
(providing that the probate "tax imposed by this section shall not apply to decedents'
estates of $5,000 or less in value").
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-121, (Repl. Vol. 1991).
67. Act of Apr. 6, 1994, ch. 393, 1994 Va. Acts 569 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
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where it will be desirable for four or more persons to be in-
volved in the administration of a decedent's estate, but a rea-
sonable number of cases can be expected where a non-taker,
such as a beneficiary's or decedent's lawyer, will be serving as
personal representative with others who are all takers.
J. Inter Vivos Trusts-Merger
The common law rule of merger provides that "if two consec-
utive, vested, legal estates in land should, after their creation,
come to be owned by the same person, the lesser estate is
merged in the larger."' To illustrate, suppose X conveys to Y
for life, remainder to the heirs of Z (a living person). First, the
state of the title is possessory life estate in Y, contingent re-
mainder in the (unascertained) heirs of Z, and reversion in fee
simple in X (which is vested, subject to complete divestment in
favor of Z's heirs upon Z's death). Second, if, sometime prior to
Z's death, X conveys X's reversion to Y (the life tenant), Y will
now own two, consecutive, vested, legal estates, and the smaller
(the life estate) will merge into the larger (the reversion in fee
simple) and cease to exist as a separate estate. Under a further
common law rule, the doctrine of destructibility of contingent
remainders, the consequence of the above merger would be the
destruction of the contingent remainder in the heirs of Z, with
the result that the state of the title would be "Y, in fee simple
absolute."69
In this context, certain title insurance companies became
concerned with the state of the title to real estate held in a
revocable, inter vivos trust where the settlor was the sole trust-
ee and sole beneficiary during the settlor's lifetime, and the
only interest not owned by the settlor was a contingent future
interest in the settlor's heirs, surviving children, or some other
unascertained group. There was no justification for such a con-
cern because: (1) the doctrine of merger does not apply to land
§ 64.1-121 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
68. LEwis M. SIMEs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 15, at 51
(1951).
69. Id. "If the prior estate of freehold [Y's life estate] terminates before the hap-
pening of the contingency on which a contingent remainder is limited [Z's death], the
remainder can never take effect." Id.
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held in trust, but only to legal interests in land,"0 (2) the doc-
trine of merger does not apply if the life estate, contingent
remainder, and reversion are created at the same time by the
same instrument,"' and (3) even if the doctrine of merger did
apply, the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders
has been abolished in Virginia. 2 Nevertheless, new Code sec-
tion 55-7.1 was enacted to provide that "[tihe doctrine of merg-
er shall not apply to inter vivos trusts in which the trustee,
whether the creator or a third party, is a beneficiary and has
the power of revocation or power of appointment over the trust
corpus., 7'
K Probate Avoidance-Boat Titles
The Code contains a number of statutes designed to assist a
decedent's successors in interest to avoid probate in situations
where it would not otherwise be necessary except for the pres-
ence of certain assets. These provisions were expanded in 1993
to include watercraft for which a title was issued by the Vir-
ginia Department of Game, Inland Fisheries and Boating.74 A
similar statute focusing on vessels registered with the United
States Bureau of Customs, but restrained to instances where
the vessel's market value did not exceed $7,000, was amended
by the 1994 Session to apply to all such vessels regardless of
their market value. 5
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-15 (Rep. Vol. 1986).
73. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 563, 1994 Va. Acts 789 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-7.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)). The enactment further provides that "[s]uch a trust,
whenever created, is for all purposes a valid trust so long as the trust document
identifies one or more other beneficiaries, whether present or future, vested or contin-
gent." Id.
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-717.3 (Cum. Supp. 1994), discussed in J. Rodney
Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts and Estates, 27 U. RICH. L.
REV. 833, 837 (1993).
75. Act of Apr. 6, 1994, ch. 399, 1994 Va. Acts 572 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-123.2 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
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L. Environmental Concerns
The 1990 Session amended section 64.1-57, which authorized
the incorporation by reference of certain fiduciary powers into
wills and trusts, by adding a new subsection containing exten-
sive powers relating to environmental concerns.76 The portion
of this amendment relating to a fiduciary's personal liability,
which was inappropriately placed in the powers section in the
first place, was moved by the 1994 legislation to new section
26-7.4." This legislation adds a further provision to the new
section purporting to insulate a fiduciary from liability under
environmental laws "unless the fiduciary's acts or omissions
outside the scope of its fiduciary duties constitute conduct that
independently would give rise to individual liability."78
M. Elder Law
The 1994 Session continued the trend of recent sessions in
passing numerous bills relating to this recently recognized sepa-
rate field of law. Although this legislation is tangentially relat-
ed to the wills, trusts and estates field, the 1994 elder law
legislation is too extensive to summarize as a part of this sur-
vey. It is hoped that this subject might soon be addressed as a
separate subject in these pages. In the interim, it may be noted
76. This legislation is noted in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Wills, Trusts and Estates, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 827, 837 (1990).
77. Act of Apr. 8, 1994, ch. 476, 1994 Va. Acts 662 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
26-7.4(C)-(D) (Cum. Supp. 1994)) (replacing VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(tX6) (Repl. Vol.
1991)). The language reads:
A fiduciary shall not be liable in its individual capacity to any beneficia-
ry or other party for any decrease in value of assets in trust or in an
estate by reason of the fiduciary's investigation or evaluation of potential
contamination of property held in the trust or estate or the fiduciary's
compliance with any environmental law, specifically including any report-
ing or disclosure requirement under such law.
Neither a fiduciary's acceptance of property nor its failure to inspect
property shall be deemed to create any implication as to whether or not
there is or may be any liability under any environmental law with re-
spect to such property.
Id.
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-7(4XB) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
1994] 1161
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1145
that the Virginia Bar Association created a separate Elder Law
Section this past year, and that one may obtain a summary of
the 1994 legislation relating to elder law from the Association's
offices.79
III. 1993-94 JUDICIAL OPINIONS
A. Wills-Fraud and Undue Influence
The Virginia Supreme Court applied long-settled principles of
law to the facts in Carter v. Williams," and determined that,
although the contestant's evidence did not create a presumption
of undue influence, it did create a presumption of fraud."' The
presumption of fraud holding was reached "even though [the
attorney/draftsman] was not the direct beneficiary in the will.
By naming his wife as a beneficiary, [the attorney/draftsman]
became an indirect beneficiary, and that, coupled with other
suspicious circumstances, was sufficient to raise the presump-
tion."8
2
In addition to the presumption of fraud, the attorney who
drafted the testatrix' will in this case was also clearly in viola-
tion of Disciplinary Rule 5-104(B) because the attorney's wife,
who was the primary beneficiary, was not related to the testa-
tor.' However, the trial court correctly excluded the
79. Requests for the legislative summaries prepared by the Virginia Bar Associa-
tion may be addressed to the Association at 701 East Franklin Street, Suite 1120,
Richmond, Virginia 23219.
80. 246 Va. 53, 431 S.E.2d 297 (1993).
81. Id. at 59, 431 S.E.2d at 300. In reaching the latter conclusion, the court re-
lied upon a prior case where it stated:
We have repeatedly subscribed to the principle that where the
draftsman holds a position of trust or confidence, and is himself a major
beneficiary in the will, his participation creates a presumption of fraud.
The courts view such conduct with disfavor. It is necessary to overcome
this presumption by evidence which satisfies the jury, and it is for the
jury to determine whether the burden has been borne.
Carter, 246 Va. at 58, 431 S.E.2d at 300 (quoting Barnes v. Barnes, 171 Va. 1, 8,
197 S.E. 403, 405 (1938)).
82. 296 Va. at 59, 431 S.E.2d at 300 (emphasis in original).
83. DR 5-104(B) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving
the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's family any gift from a client, including a
testamentary gift, except where the client is a relative of the donee." CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY VA. LAW REG., Aug. 1993, at 5, 15.
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contestant's evidence of this violation because "[t]he Code of
Professional Responsibility does not provide a basis for private
causes of action.""
B. Wills-Testamentary Intent
The main issue in Bailey v. Kerns' was the correctness of
the trial court's ruling that a holographic writing found on the
back of a hardware store receipt contained evidence of testa-
mentary intent.' The full text of this writing was as follows:
George Kerns
When this property is sold I want this
Tommy Kerns $10,000
Shelly Guidara $10,000
David Penny $5,000
Jamie Penny $5,000
The rest goes to you and your family.
Of course all my Bills are to be paid.
Love you even if I haven't been much of a Mom
- Edith B. Kerns.87
Examining the entirety of the document, the court observed
that "the instrument contains several elements commonly asso-
ciated with wills,"88 and held "that these elements, appearing
together, constitute evidence of testamentary intent on the face
of the instrument." 9 This holding led the court to the second-
84. Carter, 246 Va. at 60, 431 S.E. at 301 (citing Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080,
1085, 266 S.E.2d 108, 112 (1980)). In Ayyildiz, the court rejected the argument that
"negligence might be founded upon a duty owed to the opposing party under the
Code of Professional Responsibility." Ayyildiz, 270 Va. at 1085.
85. 246 Va. 158, 431 S.E.2d 312 (1993).
86. 'The word 'testamentary' means 'applicable or related to death; having to do
with dispositions or arrangements effective upon the happening of that event.'" Id. at
162, 312 S.E.2d at 314-15 (quoting Poindexter v. Jones, 200 Va. 372, 376, 106 S.E.2d
144, 146 (1958)).
87. Id. at 161, 431 S.E.2d at 314.
88. Id. at 162, 431 S.E.2d at 315. These elements were the allocation of specific
dollar amounts to specified persons, followed by a disposition of the balance from the
property's sale, the fact that it was addressed to another and referred to a sale in
the future, the statement regarding the payment of all bills, the declaration of affec-
tion in closing, and the signature using Edith's full name. Id. at 162-63, 431 S.E.2d
at 315.
89. Id. at 163, 431 S.E.2d at 315.
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ary issue which was the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to
establish testamentary intent of a writing offered as a will. Al-
though observing that this question must be answered in the
negative when the will is devoid of testamentary intent, the
court referred to prior authority for the rule that "when the
face of the instrument contains some evidence of testamentary
intent, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to determine wheth-
er the instrument is testamentary in nature."'
C. Wills-Interpretation
The sole issue in Bowles v. Kinsey9 was "whether the trial
court erred in construing the term 'personal property' to include
only tangible personal property."92 Article IV of the testatrix'
attorney drawn will bequeathed "all of my personal property"
outright to her daughter, and the residuary clause in Article V
created a trust of "[a]ll the rest and residue of my property,
real, personal or mixed" for the daughter until she reached age
sixty-five. 3 The court's opinion begins with the predicable rec-
ognition that "'[t]he paramount rule of will construction is that
the intention of the testator controls,"" and that in determin-
ing this intent "a court must examine the will as a whole and
give effect, so far as possible, to all its parts."5 Having set
the stage, the court reasoned as follows: (1) "[slince the term
'personal property' is a technical term, the testatrix generally is
presumed to have used that term in its technical sense" in
Article IV,' (2) "[i]f the testatrix had intended to limit the
specific bequest in Article IV to only her tangible personal prop-
erty, she could have directed her attorney to effectuate that re-
90. Id. at 164, 431 S.E. 2d at 316 (citing Grimes v. Grimes, 175 Va. 126, 132-34,
7 S.E.2d 115, 117-18 (1940)).
91. 246 Va. 298, 435 S.E.2d 129 (1993).
92. Id. at 299, 435 S.E.2d at 129. The trust was to be divided into three equal
shares when the daughter reached the age of 60, and these shares were to be paid to
her at ages 60, 62 and 65. Id. at 300, 435 S.E.2d at 129-30.
93. Id. at 299, 435 S.E.2d at 129. The trust was to be divided into three equal
shares when the daughter reached the age of 60, and these shares were to be paid to
her at ages 60, 62 and 65. Id. at 300, 435 S.E.2d at 129-30.
94. Id. at 300, 435 S.E.2d at 130.
95. Id. at 301, 435 S.E.2d at 130 (quoting Thomas v. Copenhaver, 235 Va. 124,
128, 365 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1988)).
96. Id. at 302, 435 S.E.2d at 130.
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sult,"97 and (3) "[a] specific bequest must prevail over a residu-
al bequest."" Accordingly the court concluded that all of
testatrix' personalty passed outright to the daughter under
Article IV. The court
disagree[d] with the trial court's ruling that, in order to
give effect to the trust provisions in Article V, Article IV
must be construed to include only tangible personal proper-
ty. The record shows that the testatrix' real property is
valued at $67,5000. In accordance with the powers given
the trustees in the will, this real property can be rented or
sold to produce an income until (the daughter) is 60 years
old.'
With respect, it is submitted that the court erred in this
matter. First, the purpose of the trust was not "to produce an
income until Bowles [the daughter] is 60 years old.""° It was
to insure her "support and maintenance" until that time.01
Second, although the court refers to the record showing that
the testatrix' real estate was worth $67,500, the opinion fails to
mention that the record also shows the value of testatrix' intan-
gible personal property at her death was $137,435.13."2 Look-
ing at testatrix' goal of insuring her daughter's support until
age 65 in the context of the relatively small earnings that could
be expected from a trust of only $67,500,"° it is difficult to
believe that testatrix intended her intangible personal property,
which amounted to two-thirds of her estate, to pass outright to
the daughter upon testatrix' death instead of also going into the
trust for the daughter's benefit. On these facts, this writer, like
the trial court judge, is "lead to the inescapable conclusion" that
Article IV was intended to pass only the testatrix' tangible
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 301, 435 S.E.2d at 131.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 299, 435 S.E.2d at 130.
102. Id. at 29. This is the amount shown on the estate inventory filed by the
testatrix' executors. Appellants Appendix at 14 Bowles v. Kinsey, 246 Va. 298, 435
S.E.2d 129 (1993) (Record No. 921770).
103. The record shows that the will was drafted on November 7, 1990 and that
the testatrix died on July 12, 1991. Id. at 13, 15. This was not a time which was
characterized by high interest rates, and the entire $137,435.13 of intangible personal
property was composed of bank deposits. Id. at 14.
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personal property outright to her daughter.' Finally, some
comment must be made about the court's statement that "[i]f
the testatrix had intended to limit the specific bequest in Arti-
cle IV to only her tangible personal property, she could have
directed her attorney to effectuate that result.""° It is quite
possible that testatrix did just that, in her own words, and then
relied on his choice of legal language to accomplish that re-
sult."°c Certainly it cannot be expected that a layperson has
the ability to literally direct her attorney in the choice of legal
language to be used. This would be completely unrealistic. It is
unfortunate that the court used this language in the resolution
of this case, whatever was meant. It is submitted that had the
court remained faithful to its opening recognition that "[t]he
paramount rule of will construction is that the intention of the
testator controls,"'0 7 a complete examination of the facts, in
light of the testatrix' purpose, would have lead to a rebuttal of
the presumptive, all-inclusive meaning accorded to "personal
property."
D. Wills-Forfeiture Provisions
Virginia Foundation of Independent Colleges v. Goodrich,"~
raised the issue "whether a forfeiture provision in a will is
actuated when a beneficiary files a declaratory judgment action
seeking an interpretation of a phrase in the will.""0
Decedent's bequest of "all other of my personal property exclu-
sive of antique furniture and library [A] and [B], or the survi-
vor of them, in approximately equal shares," was interpreted by
the executor as encompassing only tangible personal proper-
ty." ' Decedent's will further provided for the forfeiture of the
gifts to any beneficiary who contested the will, or who ques-
104. More could be said in regard to this case but the space limitations of this
review article preclude a complete discussion of all points.
105. Bowles, 246 Va. at 301, 435 S.E.2d at 130.
106. How many lawyers have heard clients say the equivalent of, "I don't really
understand all of this legal mumbo jumbo, but if you say its what I want, Il sign
it."
107. Id. at 300, 435 S.E.2d at 130.
108. 246 Va. 435, 436 S.E.2d 418 (1993).
109. Id. at 437, 436 S.E.2d at 419.
110. Id. Note that this was the same issue before the court in Bowles v. Kinsey.
See supra part III.E.
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tioned any acts in its making.11 When one of the legatees
brought a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine wheth-
er the phrase "personal property" also included intangible per-
sonal property, the executor and another beneficiary asserted
that the forfeiture provision had been violated and this legatee's
gift was forfeited." On the first aspect of the forfeiture pro-
vision, the court followed the general rule that "one who seeks
the guidance of a court in interpreting a provision in a will is
not considered to have 'contested' the will in a manner which
would actuate a forfeiture clause.""' Regarding the second as-
pect of the forfeiture provision, the court concluded that the
term "question" was restricted to questions regarding the mak-
ing of the will or its provisions, and did not apply to questions
regarding the meaning of the same." Accordingly, the trial
court's action in sustaining the legatee's demurrer to the
defendants' cross-bills was affirmed."5
E. Trusts-Creation and Trustee Compensation
The issue in Ballard v. McCoy"' was the right to trustee
fees pursuant to a revocable trust agreement dated February 9,
111. The relevant part of the forfeiture clause was "in any way to contest . . .(my
will), or the validity thereof, or its due or proper execution, or the provisions applica-
ble to him or her, or any other provisions, or shall in any way question any acts in
making this will or any of its provisions." Id. at 438, 436 S.E.2d at 419.
112. The legatee's complaint requested the court to first determine if the legatee's
request was a "contest" in the context of the testator's forfeiture provision, and "[ilf
and only if" the court answered no to this inquiry, to decide the meaning of the
phrase "personal property" in the gift to the legatee. Id. at 437, 436 S.E.2d at 419.
113. Id. at 438, 436 S.E.2d at 420.
114. Id. at 439, 436 S.E.2d at 420.
Even assuming the word "question7 used in the second category includes
seeking clarification or interpretation, the punctuation used limits the
prohibition to questioning acts which surrounded the making of the will
or the making of any part of the will. Questions regarding the meaning
of the will itself or of a provision within the will are not prohibited un-
der this second category of actions.
Id.
115. Id. at 435, 436 S.E.2d at 421. The defendants also contended that they were
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the legatee's actions amount-
ed to a violation of the forfeiture provision. The court disagreed, however, noting that
all of the relevant facts and circumstances (the will, the pleadings, and the actions of
the legatee) were already before the court. Id. at 439-40, 436 S.E.2d at 420.
116. 247 Va. 513, 443 S.E.2d 146 (1994).
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1988, in which the settlor stated that "[t]o establish a trust I
transfer to you all my right, title and interest in the property
described on Schedule A attached.""7 The list of assets at-
tached to the trust agreement identified property worth, in the
trustees' estimation, $532,628.93."' Following the settlor's
death on March 6, 1990, the trustee admitted a claim in the
estate proceedings for trustee fees of $31,518.01, pursuant to
the schedule of compensation contained in the trust agree-
ment."' However, there was no evidence in the record to
show any actual or constructive delivery of any of the property
in question to the trustees, 20 and the trust agreement also
provided that "[t]his trust is established when you and I have
signed this agreement and I have delivered property to Trust-
ee."121 Relying on this language in the trust agreement, and
the common law rule requiring a transfer of property from the
settlor as a condition precedent to the creation of a trust (ex-
cept in the case of a self-trusteed trust), the court held that
"the trust contemplated by the trust agreement was never es-
tablished."' Accordingly, the trial court's allowance of com-
pensation to the trustees was reversed."
F. Gift Causa Mortis-Delivery
In the two-day period preceding his death, the donor in Woo
v. Smart,124 gave to one with whom he had a relationship
"like husband and wife" three personal checks payable to her
order in the total amount of $124,600." None of the checks
were cashed or negotiated prior to the donor's death. A declara-
117. Id. at 514, 443 S.E.2d at 146.
118. Id. at 515, 493 S.E.2d at 147.
119. Id. This portion of the trust agreement provided that "[y]our compensation for
the services which you render in accordance with this Trust Agreement shall be at
the rate of five percent of the principal and five percent of the income received by
you as Trustee." Id. The claim for compensation was based upon the value of the
assets on the list attached to the trust agreement, and income in the amount of
$97,731.17 received by settlor and settlor's spouse from the date of the trust agree-
ment through the end of 1989. Id.
120. Id. at 517, 443 S.E.2d at 148.
121. Id. at 514, 443 S.E.2d at 146.
122. Id. at 518, 443 S.E.2d at 148.
123. Id. at 518, 443 S.E.2d at 149.
124. 247 Va. 365, 442 S.E.2d 690 (1994).
125. Id. at 366, 442 S.E.2d at 691.
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tory judgment proceeding was initiated thereafter by the donor's
administrator seeking a declaration that the attempted causa
mortis gifts were invalid.' The question of first impression
on appeal was whether the delivery of the checks to the donee
was a sufficient delivery of the underlying property-the money
in the bank. The court referred to prior authority for the propo-
sition that "the required delivery must be 'actual and complete,
such as deprives the donor of all further control and domin-
ion," 7 and then noted that such deprivation did not occur in
this case because, among other things, the donor could have
issued a stop payment at any time prior to death."" Accord-
ingly, the court decided to "adopt the majority rule elsewhere
that a donor's own check drawn on a personal checking account
is not, prior to acceptance or payment by the bank, the subject
of a valid gift causa mortis."129
G. Charitable Trusts-Cy Pres Doctrine
In United States ex rel United States Coast Guard v.
Cerio,"0 a Virginia testator left his residuary estate to the
Coast Guard Academy in trust, providing that the "annual net
income form the corpus of the said fund is to be awarded and
paid to the graduating cadet who has attained the highest
126. The requirements for a valid gift causa mortis were stated by the court as
follows:
First, there must be an intent to make a gift. Second, the gift must be
of personal property. Third, the gift must be made while the donor is
under the apprehension of imminent death, upon the essential condition
that the property shall belong to the donee if the donor dies as anticipat-
ed leaving the donee surviving, and the gift is not revoked in the mean-
time. Fourth, possession of the property given must be delivered at the
time of the gift to the donee, or to someone for the donee, and the donee
must accept the gift.
Id. at 368-69, 442 S.E.2d at 692 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 370, 442 S.E.2d at 693 (quoting Quarles v. Fowlker, 147 Va. 493, 507,
157 S.E. 365, 369 (1927)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 369, 442 S.E.2d at 693. Even though such a check is not accepted or
paid by the bank, the gift should also be complete if the donor's personal check is
negotiated to a holder in due course prior to donor's death, because this negotiation
will terminate the donor's personal defense of lack of consideration, and thus would
deprive the donor of "dominion and control" over the money in question. VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.3A-305(b) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
130. 831 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Va. 1993).
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grade average in chemistry and physics while enrolled in the
Academy.131 The amount of this annual award was projected
to be between $65,000 and $130,000, based on a corpus of
$1,300,000 and a range of interest rates from five to ten per-
cent, but there was no mention in the case that the testator
was aware of this fact."' The Academy believed that the
award of such a significant sum to a cadet each year "would
disrupt the Academy's educational program and unduly inter-
fere with its mission of preparing young men and women for a
life of public service in the Coast Guard."" Accordingly, being
unwilling to accept the trust under testator's terms, the Acade-
my sought judicial modification thereof pursuant to the equita-
ble doctrine of cy pres." This doctrine, which is statutory in
Virginia,"5 "permits courts to alter a [charitable] trust so as
to carry out a testator's intent 'as near as possible' when it is
not possible to effectuate this intent in the exact manner speci-
fied by the testator.""6 Following a detailed analysis of the
facts and the law, this well-written, thirteen-page opinion ap-
plies the doctrine of cy pres and modifies testator's trust to pro-
vide for two annual $750 awards (one in physics and the other
in chemistry) and for a number of other awards and uses bene-
ficial to the Academy." 7
H. Trusts-Premature Termination
Section 55-19.4, added to the Code in 1991, is entitled "peti-
tion for reformation of trust," but it also provides for the pre-
mature termination of trusts. In fact, if read literally, this sec-
131. Id. at 534.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-31 (Repl. Vol. 1986). "For the doctrine of cy pres to be
properly invoked, there must be: '(1) a valid charitable trust without a gift over, (2)
an existing general charitable intent, and (3) the beneficiaries must be indefinite or
uncertain, or (4) the purpose of the trust must be indefinite, impossible to perform,
or so impracticable of performance as to characterize the fulfillment of the purpose as
'impossible." Cerio, 831 F. Supp. at 535 (quoting Smith v. Moore, 225 F. Supp. 434,
441 (E.D. Va. 1963), modified and remanded on other grounds, 343 F.2d 594 (4th Cir.
1965) (emphasis in original)).
136. Cerio, 831 F. Supp. at 535.
137. Id. at 541-43.
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tion authorizes termination of trusts contrary to long-standing
common law and regardless of a spendthrift provision, solely on
the ground that such termination would "benefit... the inter-
ests of any beneficiary . ... ""
Herndon v. Chesapeake National Bank..9 was an action
brought by trust beneficiaries under section 55-19.4 to termi-
nate a spendthrift trust on the ground that "termination of the
trust would benefit them and their [economic] interests will be
adversely affected if the trust is not terminated.""4 The trial
court, however, declined to accept the requested literal reading
of the statute. The court reasoned:
[to adopt the petitioners construction of this statute would
seem to imperil the ability of both testators and lawyers to
establish trusts and plan estates with reasonable assurance
that their intentions will be carried out. A more logical
interpretation, it seems to me, is to consider the statute as
a means provided by the Legislature to alleviate hardship
and to allow for some flexibility where changes in tax laws
or other circumstances clearly warrant the reformation or
termination of a trust."'
Although this was an excellent decision, it is not precedent
outside of its circuit and thus legislation is still necessary to
correct the underlying problem in Virginia law.
IV. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION-TRANSFERRING REALTY To
A SELF-TRUSTED INTER VIVOS TRUST
The concept of the revocable, inter vivos trust as a will sub-
stitute has been receiving significant attention both nationally
and locally.' One of the considerations involved in making
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4(D) (Cum. Supp. 1994); see J. Rodney Johnson, An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts and Estates, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 925,
931-33 (1991) (discussing this problem). This discussion concludes by noting that
"[aibsent remedial action to restrict the scope of this statute, it may be that the
prudent Virginia attorney will be forced to create trusts under the laws of other
jurisdictions in order to insure that a client's legitimate purposes will not be frus-
trated." Id. at 932-33.
139. 33 Va. Cir. 152 (Lancaster County 1994).
140. Id. at
141. Id. at.
142. For a discussion of this concept in the context of Virginia law, see J. Rodney
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the choice between the will and the inter vivos trust is the cost
of "funding" (i.e., transferring assets to) the inter vivos trust by
the settlor. In this regard, it has generally been believed that a
grantor's deed conveying real estate to an inter vivos trust of
which the grantor was the initial beneficiary would be exempt
from Virginia's recordation tax," even though the trust assets
will pass to others at the grantor's death, under either the
identity exemption'" or the deed of gift exemption. 4 '
However, a recent opinion of the Virginia Attorney General
concluded that the identity exemption is not available in these
cases' because although there is an identity between the
grantor in the deed and the initial beneficiary, "the subsequent
or contingent beneficiary of the trust is a different person."47
This opinion also concluded that the deed of gift exemption is
not available in these cases because it applies to deeds of gift
between individuals and "in it's ordinary meaning the term
'individual' does not include a trust."' Legislation seeking to
overturn this opinion was introduced into the 1994 Session, but
it did not pass. '49 The applicability of the recordation tax to
inter vivos trusts obviously makes them more expensive to fund
and thus this opinion may be expected to diminish the use of
inter vivos trusts as will substitutes in marginal cases.
Johnson, The Living Trust vs. The Will: Which is Best for the Typical Virginian?, VA.
LAW., Jan. 1994, at 37. See also Mark G. Ferguson, Tempting the Title Insurance
Company Gods-Placing Real Property in a Revocable Living Trust, VA. ST. B. TR. &
EST. SEC. NEWSL., Summer 1994, at 21.
143. The recordation tax is $0.15 per $100 (or fraction thereof) of the greater of
the consideration for the transfer or the actual value of the property being conveyed.
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-801 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
144. The identity exemption exempts from the recordation tax any deed (conveying
real estate) "[t]o trustees of a trust, when the grantors in the deed and the beneficia-
ries of the trust are the same persons ... . VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-811(AX12) (Cum.
Supp. 1994).
145. The deed of gift exemption provides in part that "[n]o recordation tax shall be
required for the recordation of any deed of gift between an individual grantor or
grantors and an individual grantee or grantees when no consideration has passed
between the parties." VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-811(D) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
146. 1993 ATTy. GEN. ANN. REP. 258.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. H.B. 787, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1994).
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V. SUMMARY
1993-1994 witnessed the enactment of more than the average
volume of legislation in the field of wills, trusts and estates.
Most of this legislation, whether consumer-oriented or lawyer's
technical work, resulted from proposals that were studied,
drafted and requested by the Wills, Trusts, and Estates Section
of the Virginia Bar Association."W In so doing, this group has
rendered significant service to the General Assembly and to the
Commonwealth for which it should be commended.
150. The legislation discussed in Paragraphs B, C, D, E, F, I, J and L of Part II
originated in this Section's legislative committee.
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